Download Affectivity and Philosophy after Spinoza and Nietzsche: by Stuart Pethick PDF

By Stuart Pethick

ISBN-10: 1349553077

ISBN-13: 9781349553075

Pethick investigates a miles overlooked philosophical connection among of the main debatable figures within the background of philosophy: Spinoza and Nietzsche. by way of studying the an important function that affectivity performs of their philosophies, this ebook claims that the 2 philosophers percentage the typical objective of creating wisdom the main strong have an effect on.

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Extra info for Affectivity and Philosophy after Spinoza and Nietzsche: Making Knowledge the Most Powerful Affect

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This means that following the 20 Affectivity and Philosophy after Spinoza and Nietzsche examination of affectivity and ideas, a critique of the interpretation of Spinoza as a proto ‘anomalous monist’ – someone who suggests that all of reality is essentially physical yet dualistically explainable – will take place in order to show how ideas are not reducible to physicality for Spinoza, because thinking is an irreducible power of expression (what he terms as an ‘attribute’). However, it will also be shown how this does not result in a dualism for Spinoza, because thought takes place within the immanent realm of affective experience – and it is here that we can test the adequacy of our ideas.

Descartes claims that with the idea of God, the most real being and cause of it of all can be glimpsed. The whole force of the argument lies in this: I recognise that it would be impossible for me to exist with the kind of nature I have – that is, having within me the idea of God – were it not the case that God really existed. 45). 46). Descartes (1996: 24–36; Meditations 3). Descartes (1996: 8; Preface to the Meditations). 9 The claim is that whatever objective reality lies in the idea must also lie in its cause’s formal reality, otherwise it would be necessary to posit something in an effect that was not contained in its cause, which would be to posit the absurd idea that something can come from nothing.

78). P33). P49S). 35 As Yovel (1989b: 4) puts it, for Spinoza ‘we judge as we perceive (or conceive); more precisely, we cannot have an idea without automatically affirming the existence of its object’. Bennett (1984: 165) considers this to be a serious oversight, but this is only so if a cognitivist approach is desired, and this is certainly not something that Spinoza is after (see note 37). P49S. More thorough elaborations of Spinoza’s defence are offered by Beavers & Rice (2001), Mason (2004) and Matheron (2001).

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