By Willard C. Matthias
This survey of greater than fifty years of nationwide safety coverage juxtaposes declassified U.S. nationwide intelligence estimates with lately published Soviet files disclosing the perspectives of Soviet leaders and their Communist allies at the comparable occasions. Matthias exhibits that U.S. intelligence estimates have been often right yet that our political and armed forces leaders ordinarily neglected them—with occasionally disastrous effects. The e-book starts with a glance again on the position of U.S. intelligence in the course of global battle II, from Pearl Harbor during the plot opposed to Hitler and the D-Day invasion to the "unconditional hand over" of Japan, and divulges how higher use of the intelligence on hand can have kept many lives and shortened the conflict. the next chapters facing the chilly battle reveal what details and recommendation U.S. intelligence analysts handed directly to policymakers, and likewise what occasionally sour coverage debates happened in the Communist camp, referring to Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile obstacle, the turmoil in jap Europe, the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars within the heart East, and the Soviet intervention in Afganistan. in lots of methods, it is a tale of neglected possibilities the U.S. executive needed to behavior a extra dependable overseas coverage which may have refrained from huge losses of lifestyles and large bills on fingers buildups. whereas no longer exonerating the CIA for its personal errors, Matthias casts new mild at the contributions that goal intelligence research did make through the chilly battle and speculates on what may need occurred if that evaluation and recommendation were heeded.
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Additional resources for America's Strategic Blunders: Intelligence Analysis and National Security Policy, 1936-1991
The Allied command structure, which was not unified on the ground (at the time Montgomery commanded in Europe and Eisenhower advised from Britain), and which took guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington and from occasional summit meetings of heads of government. 3. The absence of any clear functioning lines of communications between the OSS and the military commands on the Western Front. , from Dulles in Berne) on a regular working basis. 4. A “tactical intelligence” state of mind which was encouraged by ultra and became over dependent upon it.
51 According to David Eisenhower, however, reactions at SHAEF Headquarters (still in England) were “subdued,” and General Eisenhower barely paid the news any attention. 52 Eisenhower apparently had heard nothing of the Dulles reports about the readiness of the German generals in the West to give up resistance or even to surrender unconditionally in the event Hitler was killed. He apparently felt fully engaged with his immediate battle in Normandy, and he was apparently supported in that view by General Strong (his British G-2).
By early December those divisions were on the frontier in the Ardennes. S. First Army’s G-2, Colonel Monk Dickson. These included POW statements, captured documents, reconnaissance photographs, and low-level logistics ultra. These were put together by Dickson, who on December 10 issued his “Estimate Number 37” to which he wrote the following conclusion: “It is apparent that Von Rundstedt . . has skillfully defended and husbanded his forces and is preparing for his part in the all-out application of every weapon at the focal point and correct time to achieve defense of the Reich west of the Rhine by inflicting as great a defeat on the Allies as possible.